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ABSTRACT 
In the application of game theory into the scenario of selling and buying a product in real life, sellers and buyers concern not only the 
acquisition utility of the good but also the transaction utility. To this end, in this paper we develop a game model with payoff matrix 
of aggregating transaction utility and acquisition utility, where we set the perceived transaction utility of a customer according to 
prospect theory. Moreover, we also study how the equilibrium of a game of this kind is influenced by some irrational factors that can 
be reflected by transaction utility. Finally, we use our model explain why online promotion selling in Tmall.com on Singles’ Day is 
so successful in China. 
 
Keywords:  Game theory, transaction utility, prospect theory, price discount，electronic commerce. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Game theory [17] is an effective tool to help the players in a game rationally choose strategies that can maximize their individual 
utilities. In particular, in a trading game a buyer pays for a good just because buying can bring more profits to the buyer than not 
buying. However, situations often differ in real life. Impulsive buying often happens to almost everyone when they are offered 
tremendous discount in a sale promotion, which can be loosely defined as “special offer”, essentially aiming to stimulate demands 
during a certain period of time [16]. For example, a lady might not be able to resist the temptation of buying a lovely gown when it is 
50% off, even though she would regret that it costs her one month’s salary. It is irrational if we still think the utility of a good is 
simply the acquisition utility of the good, which depends only on the value of the gown received compared with the price. Actually, 
this kind of impulsive buying takes up the majority purchases in shopping mall and supermarkets, and in some situation, it even 
covers 80% of sales [27]. Then why does it often happen? 
 
To answer the question, this paper will develop a new game model that can put such an irrational factor into account. More 
specifically, we will build a game model based on transaction utility theory [23] and prospect theory [8]. The transaction utility 
theory reveals that the utility of a good should be an aggregation of its acquisition and transaction utilities. The former one depends 
only on the value of the good received compared to the outlay, which is similar to the concept of consumer surplus; while the latter 
one depends solely on the perceived merits of the deal. Ann and Yuri [1] evidence the existence of transaction utility by an on-line 
auction experiment, which shows that people bid more for an item with a higher posted “buy now” price than for an identical item 
with a lower posted “buy later” price. Another experiment of psychology [27] also shows that the bigger the transaction utility is, the 
more purchases the subjects tend to make. Therefore, in our model the payoff that a player takes a strategy is the aggregation of the 
perceived transaction utility and acquisition utility. Moreover, for the individual customers during a transaction, according to 
prospect theory [8] they perceived utility in a special non-linear way. Accordingly, we set the buyer’s transaction utility in the fashion 
of the value function model of prospect theory [8]. In addition, using our model we discuss how some rational and irrational factors 
influence the equilibrium of a game of this kind, so that the marketing manager of an online company can better understand that for 
each kind of customers, how much discount is enough for stimulating them to buy. 
 
With our new irrational rational game model, we can better understand why online shopping is so popular. That is, people see a price 
of a good when they are on high streets; but when they browse the Internet, they often find the same product but in a lower price. Thus, 
the price difference turns into a perceived transaction utility, which makes them buy the good impulsively. The success of 
“Tmall.com Singles’ Day Festival” is a very convincing piece of evidence for the effect of transaction utility (we will discuss in 
details in the illustration section). Another evidence is that one of the main reasons why university students in China shopping online 
is low-price [28]. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Firstly, we recap and discuss relevant concepts and notations in transaction theory and 
prospect theory. Secondly, we define our game model. Thirdly, we reveal some properties of the model. Fourthly, we employ the 
model to explain the success of Tmall.com on Singles’ Day Festival in China. Fifthly, we discuss some related work to show clearly 
how our work advances the state-of-art. Finally, we conclude the paper with some future research directions. 
 
PRELIMINARY 
This section will recap and discuss the relevant concepts and notations in transaction theory [23] and prospect theory [8], which we 
need to build up our game model. 
 
Buyer Side 
We first discuss different situations for individual customers. The transaction utility of a good mainly comes from the customer’s 
Page 48
Zhou & Luo 
The Sixteenth International Conference on Electronic Business, Xiamen, December 4-8, 2016 
 
personal experience of buying it and its reference price perceived from the environment [12], including the original price label, the 
salesman’s verbal cues, the price presented in the official website, and so on. The acquisition utility of a good is determined mainly 
by the reservation price and the selling price of the good. Behavior experiments [9] suggests that subjects who played the role of 
buyers in a price negotiation adopted their reservation price as a reference point. And during the purchasing period, it would be 
perceived as gains or losses by the buyer depending on whether the selling price is lower or higher than the reference point. 
 
To allow different weights, in [23] a buyer’s total utility function of a good z is defined as follows: 
 
  w (z, p , p 
∗ ) = v p
 
, −p   + β v(−p : −p 
∗ ).    (1) 
 
where p  is the price the buyer paid for good z; p 
∗  is the reference price for z, which is an expected or “just” price for z; p   is the 
value equivalent to z, the amount of money which would leave the individual indifferent between p  or z as a gift; β  represents how 
much the buyer weights the transaction utility; v(p  , −p ) represents the buyer’s acquisition utility; and v(−p : −p 
∗ ) represents 
the buyer’s transaction utility. Actually,β is the degree to which a buyer cares about money (see the fourth section for detailed 
discussion); and p can be understood as the reservation price in microeconomics [5] (i.e., it is the highest price that a buyer is willing 
to pay). 
 
The transaction utility is gained by a customer only if the good is on sale, and the acquisition utility is gained by the customer only if 
the deal is made. So, we still need to differentiate the following situations: 1) For an individual customer, if one good is on sale and he 
bought it, then the customer gets both its transaction utility and acquisition utility. 2) If one good is not on sale and he does not buy it, 
then he gets neither of these two utilities. 3) If one good is not on sale and the customer bought it, he gets its acquisition utility but no 
transaction utility. 4) If one good is on sale but the customer has not bought it, then the customer gets no acquisition utility as he does 
not gain the product and cannot enjoy it. However, he did get a negative transaction utility because the good is on sale but he missed 
it. It is something like that at the moment when he made the decision, he missed a chance to save some money. It could cause pain in 
the customer’s heart because he might regret even after a long time. Therefore, in this case, the transaction utility is negative. The four 
situations above can be summarized in Table 1, which is helpful when we calculate the utility of an individual buyer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Further, prospect theory reveals that the utility perceived is not a linear, but non-linear, more specifically, S-shaped curve, in which 
the marginal gain decrease and the pain of losing an amount of money is larger than the happiness of gaining the same amount of 
money. So for individual buyers, a more realistic representation of utility should be figured out. In [24], Tversky and Kahneman 
advocated a form of value function. Accordingly, we define the following perceived transaction utility function of a customer with 
the value function. 
 
Definition 1. 
The perceived transaction utility t 
 
 of buyer is the transaction utility abuyer perceived. It is defined as follows: 
 
    t 
 
=  
(t )
ɑ          if t  ≥ 0
−λ(−t )
ɑ if t  < 0
 
 
(2) 
where t = β v(−p : −p 
∗ ) is the actual transaction utility when a consumer purchases good in a sale, α∈ (0, 1) and α′∈(0, 1) are 
risk attitude coefficient, and λ∈ (1, ∞) is loss aversion coefficient. 
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The reference point of the perceived transaction utility function is the p 
∗ . We can make a simple example to see the relationship 
between t 
 
 and t . In Fig. 1, line A represents t 
 
, whose α = α′= 0.7, λ = 2.25. From the Fig. 1, we clearly see that for the 
customer, the increased speed of perceived transaction utility become smaller when the total amount of transaction utility increased. 
Meanwhile, gaining the same amount of transaction utility causes less perceived transaction utility than losing the same amount of 
transaction utility. Thus we defined the buyer’s utility function with acquisition utility and perceived transaction utility as: 
 
  u (z, p , p 
∗ ) = v p
 
, −p   +  t 
 
.          (3) 
 
Seller Side 
Now we turn to discuss the seller side. Inspired by Thales’s total utility function for the customers we mentioned above, we define 
the total utility of a seller as follows: 
 
  u (z, p , p 
∗) = v  −p , p   + β v(−p 
∗: −p ),    
  (4) 
 
wherep  is the price the buyer paid for good z; p 
∗ is the seller’s reference price of the good, for example, its price before discount; 
p  is the cost of good z for the seller; βs indicates how much the seller weights the transaction utility; v  −p , p   is the 
acquisition utility; and v(−p 
∗: −p ) is the seller’s transaction utility.  
 
Sometimes it is reasonable to put the transaction utility into account of a seller. For example, Raghubir and Corfman’s experiments 
[20] showed that under some specific conditions price promotions affect pretrial brand evaluation and do so unfavorably. They also 
found that consumers tend to perceive negatively when promotions are uncommon in the industry. Moreover, frequent or large 
price promotion will damage brand equity by bringing bad influence to consumer’s loyalty and perceived value [15, 18]. On the 
contrary, when a company prices a good increasingly, it often delivers the message that its products are of high quality and thus 
makes the company’s reputation higher. So, by means of formula (4), we define that transaction utility is negative when lowering 
the price, while the transaction utility is positive when increasing. However, for the sake of space, in this paper, we focus on the 
situation of price decreasing situation. 
 
Specifically, we have: 1) If their good is on sale and a customer buys it, the company gets both transaction utility and acquisition 
utility. 2) If their good is not on sale and no customers buy it, their acquisition utility value is negative for the company has 
invested money to produce the good but gets no return. However, as they have not yet offered discount, so the value of transaction 
utility is zero. 3) If their good is not on sale and a customer bought it, they get the same acquisition utility but no transaction utility. 
4) If their good is on sale but no customers have bought it, they get both acquisition utility and transaction utility. It gets acquisition 
utility because producing the good causes them some cost but gets no return, and they gain a transaction utility because they indeed 
offered discount, which influences its reputation. The above four situations are summarized in Table2. 
 
GAME MODEL DEFINITION 
This section will define our game model of discount trading. 
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Definition 2. 
A discount trading game is a 4-tuple of (N, S, U, M), where: 
-N ={1,2},where1representsasellerand2representsabuyer. 
-  =    ×   ,where   =    , ,   ,   is the strategy setoff player i∈N. And  ,  is “Sale” and  , is “No Sale”;  
  , is “Buy” and   , is “Not Buy”. 
-U ={  (  ,  ,  ,  )|i∈N},where  (  , ,  ,  )represents the utility of player i when player 1 chooses   , ∈S and then the 
player 2 chooses  ,   ∈ S , and  (  , ,  ,  ) is given by formula (4), and   (  ,  ,  ,  ) is given by formula (3). 
-M= (  ,  ,  ,  ) indicates this game proceeds as follows: firstly seller 1 takes strategy   , ∈S and then buyer 2 takes 
strategy   ,  ∈S . 
 
We will use (s , , (  ,    ,  ,    )) to represent that player 2’s strategy is decided by player 1’s choice s , . That is, when player 1 
chooses s , , player 2 will choose  ,    , and when player 1 chooses s , , player 2 will choose  ,    , as shown in Fig. 2. From the 
game tree, we can see clearly how player 2’s moves connects to player 1’s. 
 
From Fig. 2, we can see that the game defined above is a perfect information dynamic game [26]. The seller first decides to offer a 
discount or not, and then the customer decides to buy or not. Before making a decision, the customers clearly know what discount 
they were offered and how much money they should pay. Each player in the game will choose the optimal strategy according to the 
utility that they can gain. Formally, we have: 
 
Definition 3. 
An acquisition-transaction equilibrium ς to discount trading game G is (s 
∗,s 
∗), where s 
∗∈S , s 
∗∈S  satisfying: 
 
∀s 
  ∈ S , s 
  ≠ s 
∗, u (s 
∗, s 
∗) ≥ u (s 
  , s 
  ) (5) 
  
∀s 
   ∈ S , u (s 
  , s 
  ) ≥ u (s 
  , s 
  ),  u (s 
∗, s 
∗) ≥ u (s 
∗, s 
  ) (6) 
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From Fig. 3, we can understand Definition 3 better. In every sub game of the discount trading game G, for the buyer, s 
  is the 
better choice. Then the seller can choose his better choice s 
∗  according to the pay-off. In the sub game where the s 
∗  leads to, the 
dominant choice s
 
′
of the buyer is s 
∗.  
 
Using our game model with utility functions (3) and (4), we can explain some phenomena well in real life. If acquisition utility is 
concerned, it just can reflect material payoff. This makes the game model not be able to explain the situation of impulsive buying 
something due to discount but still not worth that price, such as some luxury goods because it is known to almost everyone that a 
luxury good’s material pay-off is not that much but owning a luxury good can symbolize a buyer’s status and taste. For example, 
Chinese people pay tremendous money aboard to buy luxury goods with discount they cannot get in domestic markets, because the 
discounts stimulate them to buy those luxury goods that can symbolize their richness. It is the transaction utility, instead of the 
acquisition utility, that triggers them to do crazy shopping overseas.  
 
Theorem 1. 
For the buyer, let v(−p : −p 
∗ ) = p 
∗ − p  , and let v p , −p   = p − p . Then the buyer’s utility  u of strategy profile 
(s , , s , ,) can be positive even its corresponding acquisition utility is negative. 
 
Proof. By formula (3), we have  u = v p , −p   +  t 
 
, and according to the premise, we have v p
 
, −p  < 0. Now we should 
prove  t 
 
> − v p
 
, −p   is possible. Since this paper focuses on price decreasing situation, we have   
∗ −   > 0. If   > 0, 
thent =   (   
∗ −   )> 0, so we have  t 
 
 = (  (p 
∗ − p ))
  . We have: 
 
v p
 
, −p   +  t 
 
> 0 ⇔  (   (p 
∗ − p ))
  > −( 
 
−   ) 
              ⇔    >
( 
 
−   )
 
 
p 
∗ − p 
. 
It means when   >
(      ）
 
 
  
∗    
, the gain of the perceived transaction utility is able to compensate the loss of the acquisition utility. 
But when  < 0,  β  (p 
∗ − p )< 0, so  t 
 
= −λ(   (p 
∗ − p ))
  < 0. And we have t 
 
+v ( 
 
−   ) < 0. In this case, the gain of the 
perceived transaction utility is unable to compensate the loss of the acquisition utility. 
 
The following is straightforward by Definition 3. 
 
Theorem 2. 
For any game with transaction utility and acquisition utility, there exists an acquisition-transaction equilibrium. 
 
 
PROPERTIES 
This session will discuss how the outcome of our game is influenced by various factors. The result can tell a marketing manager 
that for what kind of customers, how much discount they should make to attract them to buy. 
 
Now we discuss the different situation of β. For all the players in a game, the values of parameter β in their utility functions can fall 
into the following 3 categories: 1) 0 ≤ β ≤ 1; 2) β > 1; and 3) β < 0. We first discuss the customers. For the customers in category 1), 
they care about not only money they may pay but also the value of the good itself equally or even more. This kind of customers 
tend to estimate the value of the good according to both its acquisition utility and its transaction utility. For the customers in 
category 2), they care about money so much that we can call them bargain hunters. That is, whatever they buy, they tend to choose 
the one that they can take advantage of. For the customers in category 3), they gain negative (instead of positive) transaction utility 
when the price is lower. Maybe these are vain customers who want to buy expensive good to manifest their taste or show off 
themselves to others, or they just simply take price changing as an important message of good’s quality and hate lowing the quality, 
even though they can save some money. 
 
The three categories of β can also be applied to the seller, depending on who is the one suffering from price changing. For the 
sellers in category 1), they may sell general consumers goods, and if lowering the price, their reputations will be damaged, but the 
acquisition utility is more or equally important. For the sellers in category 2), they produce goods, which values depend desperately 
on the company’s reputation instead of the goods’ functions. We can take luxury goods as an example. If a company tries to trigger 
the massive shopping by a huge price discount, their luxurious image will be ruined and none will believe that their product is 
highly valuable any longer. Category 3) means declining price will increase the company’s reputation. This sort of companies 
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might be completely new in a market and so try to use market penetration pricing strategy (i.e., setting low level of price to quickly 
build market share [25]). Thus, with the increasingly growing market share, they have a chance to make themselves known to more 
new customers and manifest a strong brand image. 
 
Now we examine the above discussion more accurately according to the game tree as shown in Fig. 4. Notice that the perceived 
transaction utilities of the buyer when buying or not buying are denoted as t 
 
 and  t′  
 
respectively, where formula (2) should be 
applied. Since we focus on price decreased situation andt  =  (  
∗ −   ), t′  = −  (  
∗ −   ).  We have t 
 
= (  (  
∗ −   ))
ɑ if 
   ≥ 0,  t 
 
= − (−  (  
∗ −   ))
ɑ′ if    < 0;   and  t′ 
 
= − (  (  
∗ −   ))
ɑ if    ≥ 0 and  t′ 
 
= (−  (  
∗ −   ))
ɑ  if    < 0. 
 
Theorem 3. 
Under all the three conditions, the payoff of the seller is always bigger when a customer chooses Buy than Not Buy. 
 
Proof. 
Firstly we compare the payoff of the seller between (s , , s , ) and (s , s , ), and then we compare the payoff of the seller between 
(s , , s , ) and (s , s , ). 
 
If the seller chooses s , , the seller’s utility difference when the buyer chooses “Buy” or “Not-buy” is: 
 
u  s , , s ,   − u  s , s ,   =  −p  − β p 
∗ + (1 + β )p   −  p  + β (p  − p 
∗)  = p . 
 
Since p > 0, when the seller chooses the strategy of sale, the seller’s payoff will be bigger if the buyer chooses to buy. 
 
If the seller chooses s , , the seller’s utility difference when the buyer chooses “Buy” or “Not-buy” is: 
 
u  s , , s ,   − u  s , s ,   =  −p  + p 
∗  − (−p ) = p 
∗. 
 
Since p 
∗> 0, when the seller chooses not to sale, the payoff will be bigger if the buyer chooses to buy. 
 
Theorem 4. When a customer decides to buy, 
if0≤β ≤1orβ >1or−1<β <0, then it is better for the seller to choose no sale; and if β <−1, then it is better for the seller 
to choose sale. 
 
Proof. 
We can see the difference between u  s , , s ,  and u  s , s ,   as follows: 
 
 u  s , , s ,   − u  s , s ,   =  −p  − β p 
∗ + (1 + β )p   −  −p  + p 
∗  
= (1 + β ) (p  − p 
∗). 
 
Since we focus on the situation of price decreasing, we have p  − p 
∗< 0. So, when β > −1, (1 + β ) (p  − p 
∗)< 0. Thus, 
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u  s , , s ,   − u  s , s ,  < 0. Then it is better for the seller not to choose sale. When β < −1, (1 + β ) (p  − p 
∗)> 0. Thus, 
u  s , , s ,   − u  s , s ,  > 0. Then it is better for the seller to choose sale. 
 
Theorem 5. 
The general equilibrium conclusion is presented in Table 3. 
 
Proof. We use the backward induction method to prove it. During the whole proving procession, we should remember p <p 
∗ and 
p <p 
∗ , since this paper focuses on theprice decreasing situation. The proof method is similar to those of Theorem 3 and 4.We first 
consider the buyer’s utility when the good is not on sale. We have: 
 
1)When p
 
−p 
∗ > 0, which means p
 
>p 
∗ , for the buyer, it holds u  s , , s ,  >u  s , s ,  , which means if the good is not on sale, 
the buyer gets a higher utility if choosing to buy. Then the seller should consider when the good is on sale, what strategy the buyer 
will choose, so that the seller can figure out their own utility. 
 
When the good is on sale, we can assume that when choosing to buy, the buyer got a bigger amount of total utility. If  β > 0, then 
we have: 
 
u  s , , s ,  >u  s , s ,   ⇔ p  − p  +  t 
 
> t  
 
 
⇔ p
 
− p  +   β  (p 
∗ − p ) 
 
> −   β  (p 
∗ − p ) 
  
                                                       (7) 
 
If  β < 0, then we have: 
 
u  s , , s ,  >u  s , s ,   ⇔ p  − p  +  t 
 
> t  
 
 
⇔ p
 
− p  −  ( β  (p 
∗ − p ))
   > − β  (p 
∗ − p ))
ɑ.                                                        (8) 
 
So, the buyer will choose to buy when the good is on sale if  β  satisfies p   − p  +  t 
 
> t  
 
,while he will choose not to buy 
when the good is on sale if  β  does not satisfy p   − p  +  t 
 
> t  
 
.  
 
Now we discuss the situation where  β  satisfies p  − p  +  t 
 
> t  
 
. Since the seller knows the buyer will choose to buy when 
the good is on sale or not on sale, as we just discussed, he can compare his own utility when the good is on sale or not. Then we 
have(s , , (s , , s , )). We first assume that when choosing sale, the seller can get a higher utility. Then we have: 
 
u  s , , s ,  >u  s , s ,   ⇔ −p  − β p 
∗ + (1 + β )p  > −p  + p 
∗ ⇔ β  < −1. 
 
So, we can see that when   < −1, the seller should choose to sale. So, the equilibrium becomes (Sale, Buy). When   > −1, the 
seller would choose not for sale, the equilibrium will fall in (No Sale, Buy). 
 
We then discuss the situation where     does not satisfy p  − p  +  t 
 
> t  
 
 . Under this condiction, the buyer will choose not to 
buy when the good is on sale, but the buyer will still choose to buy when the good is not on sale as  
 
 − p 
∗ > 0.Thus,(s , , (s , , 
s , )). This may sound odd, but it often happens to people who want to manifest their status by the high price, especially in a 
developing country like China. Now the seller should consider his total utility between sale and no sale. If the utility of choosing 
sale is bigger, we have: 
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u  s , , s ,  >u  s , s ,   ⇔ −p  + β (p  − p 
∗) > −p  + p 
∗ ⇔ β  <
  
∗
      
∗ . 
 
So, we can see that when β  <
  
∗
      
∗, the seller will choose sale, and then the equilibrium becomes (Sale, Not Buy); and 
whenβ  >
  
∗
      
∗, the seller will choose no sale, theequilibrium becomes (No Sale, Buy). 
 
2)We then discuss the situation where p
 
−p 
∗ < 0, which means p
 
<p 
∗ , then forthe buyer, if the good is not on sale, the utility will 
be bigger when he chooses not to buy. That is, u  s , , s ,  < u  s , s ,  . Then the seller should consider when the good is on 
sale, what strategy the buyer will choose to maximize his total utility, too. Formula (7) is applied again and the result can be quote: 
the buyer will choose to buy when the good is on sale if β satisfies p  − p  +  t 
 
> t  
 
, while the buyer will choose not to buy 
when the good is on sale if β does not satisfy p  − p  +  t 
 
> t  
 
.  
 
If β satisfies p  − p  +  t 
 
> t  
 
, then we have (s , , (s , , s , )). The seller should compare his own utility between sale and no 
sale. If sale is better than no sale, then we have: 
 
u  s , , s ,  >u  s , , s ,   ⇔ −p  − β p 
∗ + (1 + β )p  > −p  ⇔    <
  
  
∗   
. 
 
We can see that if β  <
  
  
∗   
, the seller will choose sale, and then the equilibriumwill be (Sale, Buy); when β  >
  
  
∗    
, the seller 
will choose no sale, and thus theequilibrium becomes (No Sale, Not Buy). 
 
If  β  does not satisfy p  − p  +  t 
 
> t  
 
,then we have (s , , (s , , s , )). The buyer will choose not to buy when the good is on 
sale. So, if we assume the seller’s utility is bigger when he chooses sale, then we have: 
 
u  s , , s ,  >u  s ,  , s ,   ⇔ −p  + β (p  − p 
∗) > −p  ⇔ β  < 0. 
 
So, we can see that when β <0, the seller should choose sale, and thus the equilibrium is (Sale, Not Buy); 
when β >0,thesellershouldchoosenosale,andthustheequilibriumbecomes(NoSale,NotBuy).                  
 
According to Table 3, we can forecast the equilibrium of the game when a price strategy was taken. For example, if a good was 
often perceived too expensive without discount, i.e., p
 
< p 
∗ , and its target customers’ β satisfies p
 
− p  +  t 
 
> t  
 
, and the 
company’s β is less than
  
  
∗   
, then we can forecast the equilibrium is (Sale, Buy),which means that the company will choose sale, 
and the customer will choose to buy. In the next section, we present an example of this circumstance. 
 
SINGLES’ DAY SHOPPING FESTIVAL 
With the new game model we developed, we can explain the amazing success of the Tmall.com (the biggest online shopping 
website in China) on Singles’ Day Shopping Festival. On the Singles’ Day of 2015 (i.e., 11 November 2015), the total sales were 
91,200 million Chinese Yuan, or say 143 billion USA dollars. This sales broke the Guinness World Records [4]. It was reported 
that during the first hour on that day, the sales surpassed the sum sales of “Black Friday” and “Cyber Monday” in America in 2014. 
Now suppose there is a silk shirt that a customer has been longed for but too expensive to afford. More specifically, it is priced at 
300 RMB but a customer can just pay 240 RMB for it. The shirt’s company usually offers no discounts except on Singles’ Day 
Festive of Tmall.com. That is, on Singles’ Day, customers just need to pay 250 RMB for it. However, for the company, the total 
cost of this shirt is 150 RMB and so there are still profits for the company. Suppose the company is famous for its brand 
management and high quality, so doing price promotion can actually harm its brand reputation. Thus, we can assume β  = 1. 
Suppose a customer is a student having little money, so he likes to save money and thus we can assign 1 to β as well. Based on 
function (2), we assign 0.7 to α and α′, and assign 2.25 to λ. 
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If we only use acquisition utility to measure the utility of the customer, the customer will not buy the shirt whether the seller 
chooses sale or not, since the value of the acquisition utility is negative when buying, less than the value of the utility when not 
buying. However, when considering transaction utility in game model, the outcome is different. The game tree between the 
company and the customer is shown in Fig. 5. 
 
We use backward induction to find out the equilibrium. That is, the seller choosess , , then two choices are left for the buyer in the 
sub game, i.e., Buy or Not-Buy in the sub track of the tree in Fig. 5. The buyer will choose the one that brings him a bigger utility. 
If the company offers discount, the customer will buy the silk shirt because 5.46 > −34.79; otherwise, the customer will not buy the 
silk shirt because −10 < 0. So we have (s , , (Buy, Not-buy)). Now the seller can predict that if he chooses s , = Sale, the outcome 
of this game is (Sale, Buy), and if he chooses s , = No-Sale, the outcome of this game is (No-sale, Not-buy). Accordingly, he can 
compare the outcomes of these two choices and take the better one,s 
∗= Sale, which brings him a bigger utility. Onces , is settled, 
player 2’s choice is settled, i.e., s 
∗ = Buy. Then we have equilibrium (s 
∗,s 
∗) =(s , , s , ). 
 
Therefore, by putting the perceived transaction utility into account of a game, we can see that if a good is discounted appropriately, 
it will be sold out. Even if the seller earns less in one deal, but it can maximize its total material revenue by selling more. 
 
RELATED WORK 
In [22], the authors views a company and residential consumers as two players in a dynamic game, in which the latter’s strategy 
chosen will be the consequence of the former’s, and try to find out the optimal pricing strategy. The work in [21] analyses 
consumer’s utilities with different promotion strategies of supermarket retailers. The work in [13] considered the influences of unit 
marketing expenditure and the unit price charged by the buyer in the end demand of the product in both cooperative and 
non-cooperative games. In [3], the authors managed to figure out the optimal pricing strategy for a new product in dynamic 
oligopolies by considering price effect and adoption effect. However, all the above studies concern little about the transaction 
utility attached to promotion, which makes them less capable to explain impulsive buying behavior in real life. Rather, in this paper, 
we did put the transaction utility into account, so our model can explain and predict impulsive shopping behavior more accurately. 
 
On the other hand, pricing promotion strategy has been a very active topic in marketing research. In [30], a two-period pricing 
model is built up for a supply chain to utilize group-buying program to promote its products and derive the equilibrium decisions of 
the two supply chain members in three different scenarios. Nonetheless, their research neglected the responses of the consumer, 
thus it is hard to apply the result of the pricing model to markets in real world. In [11][19], a quantities discount pricing model is 
developed to evaluate the pricing schedule to win the heart of the customer, but none of them considers the psychological 
influences of the pricing promotion strategy. In [6], the authors presented that different kinds of promotion method influence 
consumers’ choices, but the model cannot be used to estimate the influences to the company’s reputation and the consumers’ 
perceived utility. Although in [29] the transaction utility is used to explain why consumers like price promotion so much with a lot 
of vivid examples, unlike us they did not do any quantities analysis in the framework of game theory. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we develop a game model with transaction utility, which makes three important theoretical contributions: 1) The 
rationality in game theory is no longer evaluated simply by material pay-off of the good, but also by the money saved, the 
reputation of the company that was influenced, and so on. These are important aspects that rational people often consider 
irrationally in their daily life. So, our model can better explain irrational rationality in human interaction. 2) In game theory, 
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utilities are generic, lacking of clear semantics, so too ambiguous. In our work, utility values are not just some simple numbers 
without specific semantics, rather they have clear semantics, which can make the outcome more persuasive and practical, reflecting 
well the situations about price and cost in real trading. 3) The original transaction utility function is applied to the consumers only. 
However, according to our new definition, this utility function can be applied to not only buyers but also sellers. 
 
Moreover, using our model marketing managers of some online shops can design various sale promotion strategies to attract 
various customers. Also, after they set a new promotion strategy, they can check it with our model and see whether or not it can 
stimulate customer to buy. This will bound to help making smart decisions. More specifically, since the parameters in our model 
are already set in a market and the only variable is the new price after discount, the market manager can use Table 3 to set discount 
carefully so as to attract more customers to buy. 
 
However, there are still some limitations in our work, which are worthy being removed in future. Firstly, according to framing 
effect [7], framing price promotion in different ways leads to different consumer perceptions. For example, Chinese subjects are 
more satisfied with the possibility of refunding than combining offers and percentage effect [16]. Thus, some parameters in our 
model should be different for not only different types of consumers but also different forms of price promotion. Moreover, among 
various forms of value function in prospect theory [2], it is worth studying which one is the most suitable for a specific problem 
discussed in this paper. Finally, since consumer’s experience of explosion to promotion activity (including pricing promotion) can 
change the reference price [10], it requires a facility for automated updating their sale data in time for a discount game we proposed 
in this paper. 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
This work was supported by the Bairen Plan of Sun Yat-sen University and the Natural Science Foundation of Guangdong 
Province, China (No.2016A030313231). 
 
REFERENCE 
[1] Dodonova,A. &Khoroshilov, Y. (2004). Anchoring and transaction utility: Evidence from on-line auctions. Applied Economics 
Letters, 11(5), 307-310. 
[2] Sui, D., Zhang, Y. &Zhang, Y. (2011). Prospect theory, the value function and weight function research review. Business 
Times, (31):73-75. (In Chinese) 
[3] Dockner, E. & Jorgensen, S. (1988). Optimal pricing strategies for new products in dynamic oligopolies. Marketing 
Science, 7(4), 315-334. 
[4] Guinness World Records. Highest online sales revenue generated by a single company in 24 hours. 
http://www.guinnessworldrecords.com/world-records/highest-online-sales-revenue-generated-by-a-single-company-in-24-hou
rs, 2016.04.16 
[5] Varian，H.R. Intermediate Microeconomics: A Modern Approach. 7th edition. (1999). Berkeley: W.W. Norton & Company. 
3-5. 
[6] Howell, J.R., Lee, S., & Allenby, G.M. (2013). Price promotions in choice models. Marketing Science, 35(2): 319-334.  
[7] Isabella, G., Pozzani, A.I., Chen, V.A., & Gomes, M.B.P. (2012). Influence of discount price announcements on consumer’s 
behavior.Revista De Administração De Empresas, 52(6), 657-671. 
[8] Kahneman, D.& Tversky, A. (1990). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47(2), 140-170. 
[9] Kristensen, H.& Gärling, T. (1997). Determinants of buyers' aspiration and reservation price. Journal of Economic 
Psychology, 18(5), 487-503. 
[10] Lattin, J.M. & Bucklin, R.E. (1989). Reference effects of price and promotion on brand choice behavior. Journal of Marketing 
Research,26(3), 299-310. 
[11] Lee, H.L. & Rosenblatt, M.J. (1986). A generalized quantity discount pricing model to increase supplier's profits. Management 
Science, 32(9), 1177-1185. 
[12] Lu, L.&Wang, Y. (2011). The consumers’ psychological “flight recorder” explained by the transaction utility theory. Jiangsu 
Commercial Forum, (10), 31-33. (In Chinese)  
[13] Esmaeili, M., Abad, P.L., &Aryanezhad, M.B. (2011). Seller-buyer relationship when end demand is sensitive to price and 
promotion. Asia Pacific Journal of Operational Research, 26(5), 605-621. 
[14] Osborne, M.J., (2003). An Introduction to Game Theory. New York: Oxford University Press, 169-173. 
[15] Jiang, M. &Dong W. (2003) The influence of price promotion frequency to brand equity. Management World, (7):144-146. 
(In Chinese) 
[16] Mcneill, L.S., Fam, K.S., & Chung, K. (2014). Applying transaction utility theory to sales promotion – the impact of culture on 
consumer satisfaction. International Review of Retail Distribution & Consumer Research, 24(2), 166-185. 
[17] Maschler, M., Solan, E. &Zamir, S. (2013). Game Theory. New York: Cambridge University Press. 9-10 
[18] Jiang, M. &Dong, W. (2003). The empirical study of the impact of discount amount of price promotion on brand equity. 
Page 57
Zhou & Luo 
The Sixteenth International Conference on Electronic Business, Xiamen, December 4-8, 2016 
Journal of Peking University (Humanities and Social Sciences), (5), 48-56. (In Chinese) 
[19] Monahan, J.P. (1984). A quantity discount pricing model to increase vendor profits. Management Science, 30(6), 720-726. 
[20] Raghubir, P.& Corfman, K. (1999). When do price, promotions affect pretrial brand evaluations? Journal of Marketing 
Research, 36(2), 211-222. 
[21] Richards, T.J. (2005). A nested logit model of strategic promotion. Quantitative Marketing & Economics, 5(1), 63-91. 
[22] Bazgir, S., Soleymani, S., & Mozafari, B. (2015). Residential consumers’ optimal pricing based on game theory. Bulletin of 
Environment, Pharmacology and Life Sciences, 475-481. 
[23] Thaler, R.H. (2008). Mental accounting and consumer choice. Marketing Science, 27(1), 15-25. 
[24] Tversky, A.& Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty. Journal of Risk & 
Uncertainty, 5(4), 297-323. 
[25] Keegan, W.J., Green, M.C. (2011). Global Marketing. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall,268-268. 
[26] Luo, X., Yang, Y., Wu, G. (2014) The Philosophy of Games. Guangzhou: Sun Yat-sen University Press. (In Chinese)  
[27] Wu, X. (2015) Consumer impulsive buying research based on transaction utility theory. Consumer Economics, 31(5):51-54. 
(In Chinese) 
[28] Jia, Y., Wu, D. & Wan X. (2012) The status of collage student shopping online and relevant factors analysis. Chinese General 
Practice Nursing, 10(7):662-663. (In Chinese) 
[29] Zheng, Y. &Su, D. (2013). Rational Irrationality. Beijing: China Business Press. 186-209. (In Chinese) 
[30] Zhang, J., Li, S., Liang, L., Gou, Q., & Cheng, J. (2013). A two-period pricing model with group-buying. Applications of 
Management Science, 16, 193-218. 
 
Page 58
